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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
intended to codify past practices in New York.2 2  The principal
difference between this section and its predecessor 23 is the omission
of the word "indispensable." Under the Civil Practice Act, an
indispensable party had to be joined or the action would be
dismissed.2 4  At the present time, if the questions listed in
CPLR 1001(b) cannot be answered favorably, the absent party
is "indispensable, ' 2 5 so the action must be dismissed. I-However,
it must not be forgotten that despite the codification of these
factors, the court may still exercise wide discretion in determining
whether to dismiss the action.
2 6
In the Mechta case,27 the court found the wife to be a
necessary party as prejudice to both her and the defendant might
have accrued from the non-joinder, an effective judgment could
not be rendered in her absence, and, a protective measure could
not be fashioned by the court. She was, therefore, "indispensable,"
and the action was dismissed.
While it may have been impossible for the court to fashion a
substantive measure that would have protected the parties, it would
appear that instead of outright dismissal, an alternative would have
been some form of procedural device. For example, the court
might have dismissed on the condition that the defendant stipulate
to accept service in a jurisdiction where the wife could be joined.
With this device, the plaintiff would still have had a way of
determining his alleged right, and prejudice to all parties could
have been avoided.
CPLR 1005(a).: Limited partners allowed to bring class action
and derivative action.
CPLR 1005(a) provides that
[w]here the question is one of a common or general interest of many
persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
222 WEINSTEIN, KORN & Mn.sLER, NEw YORK CivIL PRAcricE 1001.01
(1965); 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 1001, commentary 219 (1963). But note,
however, that under the CPLR it is no longer necessary to make two
motions-one to join the absent party, and in the event of non-joinder,
another to dismiss. Now a single motion to dismiss under CPLR
3211 (a) (10) is all that is required. Blumenthal v. Allen, 46 Misc. 2d
688, 260 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); The Biannual Survey
of New York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 122, 144-45 (1965).
23 CPA § 193.
24 7B McKniN.v's CPLR 1001, supp. commentary 26 (1966).
25 Ibid.
26 2 WEINSTmN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRx CML PRACTICE T 1001.08
(1965). A recent example is Provident Tradesnens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lumbermens Mit. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966). See 42 ST.
JonN's L. Rav. 108 (1967), wherein FED. R. Crv. P. 19, which is almost
identical to CPLR 1001, is explained and interpreted.
27 Mechta v. Scaretta, 52 Misc. 2d 696, 276 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967).
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numerous and it may be impractical to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
In Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp.,28 the plaintiffs, thirty-one
of the limited partners of a real estate syndicate,2 9 sued on their
own behalf and on behalf of the other limited partners. The
plaintiffs alleged "mismanagement" and "waste" on the part of
the general partners in the renegotiation of a lease and mortgage
on partnership property, thereby reducing their return from eleven
percent to eight percent. The Court of Appeals held that CPLR
1005 (a) entitled the limited partners to bring a class action for
damages on behalf of all the limited partners.
The decision is significant for two reasons. First, the ordinary
rule is that suits between partners should be brought in equity,
particularly for an accounting, and that an action at law may not
be maintained until after an accounting." Here, the Court allowed
an action at law for damages by one partner against another
without an accounting, reasoning that limited partners are in a
position analogous to corporate shareholders-limited liability and
no voice in the operation of the enterprise; that the same fiduciary
relationship that exists between corporate director and shareholder
exists between general partner and limited partner; that share-
holders could bring a representative suit against the directors for
fraudulent waste and mismanagement ;31 and, therefore, to allow
the shareholders to maintain such action but to deny limited partners
would be an anomaly.32
Secondly, and equally important, was the Court's allowance
of a class action. The Court noted that CPLR 1005(a) allows
a class action where the "question is one of a common or general
interest of many persons," and that since the limited partners
were entitled to receive a fixed return on their investment, if that
return were wrongfully impaired "all of the limited partners would
be injured in the same way and the matter would be of 'common
or general interest' to them."33  The Court indicated that since
28 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
29 Initially there were only thirty-one partners but others joined bringing
the total to 215. 18 N.Y.2d at 531 n.l, 223 N.E2d at 870 n.l, 277 N.Y.S.2d
at 379 n.l.
30 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 44. But see Herrick v. Guild, 257 App.
Div. 341, 13 N.Y.S.2d 115 (lst Dep't 1939); Burnstine v. Geist, 257 App.
Div. 792, 15 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't 1939).
31 A corporate shareholder in New York is authorized to bring an action
on behalf of the corporation where the directors wrongfully refuse to do so.
N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW § 626.
32 Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.Zd 528, 537, 223 N.E2d 869,
874, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 384 (1966).
33 Id. at 534, 223 N.E.2d at 872, 277 N,Y,S,2d at 381-82,
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some of the limited partners might not feel that the defendants
were guilty of wrongdoing and were apparently satisfied with the
new lease, rescission could not be awarded because these persons
would not be afforded the protection due process requires. This,
however, was not an "impediment" to money damages as a
judgment could in no way prejudice the absent parties.3 4
In Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky,3" decided the same
day as Lichtyger, the Court, again relying on CPLR 1005(a),
held that limited partners were authorized to sue, on behalf of
the partnership, to enforce a partnership claim where those in
control of the partnership wrongfully declined to do so. Section 115
of the New York Partnership Law states that a limited partner
"is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership,
except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right
against or liability to the partnership." The Court reasoned that
since the purpose of this statute is solely to prevent interference
by the limited partners with the general partner's conduct of the
business, and that the gravamen of the complaint was that the
general partners have declined to carry on the business of the
partnership by wrongfully refusing to enforce a partnership claim,
it would not bar the suit.-
In Lichtyger, the plaintiffs were suing in a representative
capacity, whereas in Riviera, the Court allowed the plaintiffs (five
out of approximately 350 limited partners) to maintain a derivative
suit on behalf of the partnership.3 7 It should be noted that a
representative action differs in theory from a derivative action:
in the former, the plaintiff is a representative of the class for
the benefit of the members of the class, while the latter is
technically on behalf of the organization of which plaintiff is a
member. The allowance of the derivative suit by a limited partner
in Riviera, is apparently an extension of the Court's analogy of a
limited partner to a corporate shareholder in Lichtyger.
Both Lichtyger and Riviera represent departures from estab-
lished partnership principles based primarily on the analogy
between the limited partner and corporate shareholder and indicate
that the Court will employ CPLR 1005(a) to authorize a class
suit or a derivative suit where substantial justice will be achieved.
34 d. at 537 n.2, 223 N.E.2d at 874 n.2, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 384 n.2.
3 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966).
3GRiviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223
N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (1966).
37 CPLR 1025 authorizes a partnership to "sue or be sued in the
partnership name."
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